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 Evaluating the impact of a well-targeted wage subsidy 
using administrative data 
 
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely - Ágota Scharle - Árpád Földessy   
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper measures the impact of a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers, using a 
large administrative dataset from Hungary. While such subsidies are often promoted as an 
efficient way to speed up the recovery of the economy or to increase demand for low skilled 
workers, existing evidence on their employment effects is somewhat inconclusive, especially in 
the case of transition economies. We examine employment outcomes in various model 
specifications. Results show a significant impact for men aged over 50, which is driven by the 
subgroup of those with lower secondary education. The subsidy for jobseekers with at least 
secondary education and aged over 50 is cost effective for men. We also present some evidence 
that this is not merely caused by substitution across various sub-groups of jobseekers. 
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Egy jól célzott bértámogatási program értékelése 
adminisztratív adatok alapján 
 
Cseres-Gergely Zsombor - Scharle Ágota - Földessy Árpád  
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
A tanulmány egy, a tartós munkanélküliek számára nyújtott bértámogatás hatását méri 
magyarországi adminisztratív adatok segítségével. Noha az ilyen támogatásokat gyakran 
javasolják a gazdaság élénkítésére, illetve a képzetlen munkaerő iránti kereslet növelésére, az 
elérhető - és főként a volt szocialista országokra vonatkozó - kutatások nem igazolják 
egyértelműen a hatékonyságukat. Itt a foglalkoztatásra gyakorolt hatást mérjük különféle 
modellspecifikációkban. Az eredmények szignifikáns hatást mutatnak az 50 év feletti férfiak 
esetében, amit főként a szakmunkás végzettségűekre gyakorolt hatás határoz meg. A legalább 
középiskolai végzettséggel rendelkező munkanélküliek esetében a támogatás költséghatékonynak 
is bizonyul. Bemutatjuk azt is, hogy mindez valódi hatás, nem csupán a munkanélküliek közötti 
helyettesítés okozta látszat. 
 
Tárgyszavak: bértámogatás, értékelés, idősebb munkavállalók 
 
JEL kódok: J38, J68 
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1. Introduction 
There is a clear shift in European employment policy towards active labour market programmes 
(ALMP) as opposed to cash transfers for the unemployed and the recent crisis has further 
increased the demand for well-designed policies.1 The meta-analyses of existing empirical 
evidence on ALMPs have shown that the impact of such policies is determined predominantly by 
their type, while the business cycle or labour market institutions are much less, or not important 
at all (Card et al 2010, Kluve 2010).  
According to Kluve (2010), wage subsidies and services/sanctions are the most effective in 
increasing reemployment rates. The effectiveness of wage subsidies however has been 
questioned on several accounts. First, not all empirical studies found positive and significant 
effects. In fact, the few existing papers on transition countries have all shown a neutral or 
negative impact (Kluve 2010, Betcherman et al 2004). Second, wage subsidies are relatively 
expensive, which implies that the magnitude of their effect is as important as its sign, i.e. only a 
relatively large impact can make such programmes cost effective. Third, the narrow targeting of 
subsidies may stigmatise recipients and reduce both take-up and effects (Katz 1996). Fourth, 
deadweight and substitution costs are likely to be high (Betcherman et al 2004). 
The recent global financial crisis has increased the policy relevance of wage subsidies as a 
means to preventing the rise of long-term unemployment and speeding up recovery. Such 
subsidies are especially relevant for transition economies struggling to meet EU employment 
targets. The political and economic transition of 1989 has drastically reduced the employment 
rate of low-skilled workers in Eastern Europe, and the reduction has proved to be lasting in most 
countries. This has become one of the main causes behind the rise in long-term unemployment, 
economic inactivity and persistent poverty. 
This paper aims to contribute to resolving three questions concerning the effectiveness of 
wage subsidies. 
As very few studies have been done in transition countries, it is unclear if the disparity of 
earlier findings is due to the transition environment or poor policy design. We assess a wage 
subsidy introduced in Hungary in 2007, which is a relatively well-designed scheme. It is very 
similar to the targeted payroll tax subsidies in Belgium and Finland and a targeted tax credit in 
the US, which earlier studies have shown to have some positive impact. 
                                                 
1 For a recent initiative by influential economists supporting wage subsidies as a means of speeding up 
the economic recovery see: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2010/02/economists-for-wage-
subsidies.html 
6 
 
We use a large administrative dataset, which includes information on employment and wage 
as opposed to merely recording exit from the unemployment register. This will allow us to 
compute the costs and benefits of the scheme. 
The same dataset allows us to check if there is a substitution effect for close substitutes. 
We focus on one element of a wage subsidy scheme introduced in Hungary in 2007 for 
various subgroups among the long term unemployed. This subsidy offers a temporary reduction 
on payroll tax (social security contributions) to employers, and the reduction is largest for job 
seekers aged over 50 and those with only primary education. Eligibility is determined solely by 
observable characteristics of job seekers. 
To identify the effect of the subsidy, we exploit the design of the programme and the 
availability of administrative data. As outcomes, we consider various measures of re-
employment. As the suitable control groups are eligible for a base subsidy, our estimates are 
interpreted as the additional effect of the extra subsidy for multiply disadvantaged groups.  
The dataset we use is a 50 % random sample of the total working age population and includes 
information on registration at the public employment service, receipt of welfare provisions 
(including retirement), employment and wages, for the period between 2002 and 2008. The size 
and depth of the dataset allows us to control for a richer set of observable characteristics than 
most earlier studies. 
Results show a significant positive effect on re-employment probabilities in the case of men 
aged over 50 and this result is robust to model specifications. We find positive but insignificant 
effects for women. Using the same dataset, we also estimate exit probabilities for close 
substitutes of the treatment group and find no indication of a substitution effect. Lastly, under 
conservative assumptions, the subsidy is cost effective for men with at least secondary education 
aged over 50. 
In the rest of this paper, the next section briefly reviews existing relevant research on wage 
subsidies. Section 3 describes the Hungarian scheme in detail and summarises aggregate data on 
take-up. Section 4 describes the dataset and presents raw outcome measures. Section 5 outlines 
the objects of interest and identification strategy. Section 6 presents estimation results and 
discusses their robustness, while Section 7 presents a cost-benefit analysis. 
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2. Review of research on similar policy instruments  
Similar targeted payroll tax subsidies have been used in Belgium, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the US. The „Maribel subsidies‟ system in Belgium in the late 1990s offered a 
lump sum reduction in payroll taxes for employing manual workers, so that the relative size of 
the subsidy was highest for low wage workers. Goos and Konings (2007) use firm-level data to 
evaluate the effects of changes in this scheme and find significant positive effects on 
employment. Huttunen et al (2010) estimate the employment effects of a subsidy in Finland, 
which is targeted at the employers of low-wage older workers using difference-in-difference-in-
differences. They find that the subsidy has no effects on the employment rate but it increases the 
probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment (the scheme is only available to 
full time workers). Katz (1996) reviews evaluations of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), a 
similar scheme operating in the US until 1994 and concludes that it was effective in improving 
the earnings and employment of disadvantaged groups, especially when combined with training 
elements. However, studies examining changes in the TJTC rules or its performance compared 
to more sophisticated schemes in experiments have pointed to a potential problem with narrow 
targeting. When TJTC was used without additional services (training or counselling), take up 
tended to be low and reemployment effects were small (or even negative in some experiments). 
These results were attributed to the stigmatisation of recipients. However, some of these 
concerns were called into question by later analyses showing that non-random selection into the 
treatment group could explain poor performance. Dubin and Rivers (1993) recalculate the effects 
of one such experiment in Illinois, where the treatment group were long term unemployed 
individuals who were offered a voucher, which their new employer could submit and receive a 
lump sum payment. They find that, once controlling for self-selection, the programme 
significantly increased the likelihood of re-employment. 
Schünemann et al (2011) estimate the effect of a wage subsidy for employers hiring long term 
unemployed, using information on eligibility rather than take-up, and applying an RDD in 
differences approach in order to exclude potential bias from unobserved effects. They find no 
impact on employment outcomes, nor on employment stability.
2
 The authors suggest that this 
                                                 
2 This is intriguing given that the size of the subsidy is rather large (60 % of the usual wage in the given 
occupation for 6 months and 40 % for another 6 months). However, the subsidy is conditional on 
submitting a claim at the local (or regional) job centre, and is granted at the discretion of the 
caseworker and provided that there is available funding. Also, it requires one year of continued 
employment. Lastly, the discontinuity exploited by the paper is that eligibility is conditional on 12 
months of prior unemployment, which may lead to an overestimation of programme effects if those 
with 11 months of unemployment would postpone their job entry in order to become eligible for the 
subsidy - see Brouilette and Lacroix (2010) on the problem of self-selection. 
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may be a consequence of using eligibility rather than take-up to identify the treatment effect 
since the latter combines the effect of the subsidy and finding a job. An alternative explanation is 
that this estimate applies only to a particular sub-sample of long term job seekers: those who did 
not participate in any other labour market programme, had worked for at least 6 months during 
the 12 months preceding (re)entry to the unemployment register, and were eligible for 
unemployment benefit but not exactly for 12 months.  
There are very few empirical studies on Hungarian ALMPs and as far as we know, the 
reemployment effect of the Hungarian “START” scheme has not yet been evaluated. The two 
papers that evaluate the impact of traditional wage subsidies have somewhat conflicting results. 
O‟Leary (1998) found negative or zero employment effects and a significant increase in earnings 
on the first job, except for job seekers aged over 45, where effects on both employment and 
earnings were positive and significant. Using data for 2010, Csoba et al (2012) estimate a 24-fold 
increase in log-odds of employment, which is a dubiously large effect, and is robust to controlling 
for an extensive set of individual characteristics. However, they do not control for the duration of 
the last unemployment spell.  
3. The policy instrument and the context of its introduction  
The Hungarian wage subsidy scheme examined in this paper was first introduced in October 
2005 for school leavers (START) and was extended to various subgroups among the long term 
unemployed in July 2007 (START plusz and extra). 
It is a quasi-voucher scheme that offers a temporary reduction on payroll tax (social security 
contributions) to employers hiring the holder of the ‟voucher.‟ The amount of the subsidy varies 
across eligible groups, as summarised in Table 1. All long-term unemployed are eligible for 
START plus, and START extra doubles the subsidy for a selected subgroup with multiple 
disadvantages, ie. for jobseekers above 50 and those who completed primary education only. 
Eligibility for START extra can thus be earned in two ways: by accumulating unemployment 
spells (for the uneducated) or by reaching 50 years of age (for the educated). 
The subsidy is largest for job seekers aged over 50 and those with only primary education: 
25% of the total wage cost in the first year and 14 % in the second year, with a cap set at twice the 
minimum wage. The general subsidy available to all long term unemployed is 14 % in the first 
year and 7 % in the second year.  
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Table 1.  
Rules of the various START schemes at the time of introduction 
Name Eligibility 
Amount of subsidy 
(% of total wage 
cost)* 
Ceiling on subsidy  
  1st year 2nd year  
START  
School leavers: below 25 (30 for graduates), no 
prior paid job  
14 % 7% 
1.5x minimum wage  
(2x for he. graduates) 
START Plusz  
On parental leave or care allowance, or 
registered unemployed for 12 months within 
preceding 16 months, not eligible for old age 
pension 
2x minimum wage 
START Extra  
Over 50 or primary education only,  
and registered unemployed for 12 months within 
preceding 16 months, not eligible for old age 
pension  
25 % 14 % 2x minimum wage 
* In 2007, the employer‟s contribution was 32% of the gross wage, and this was waived in full during the 
first year of employing a person with a START extra voucher. The flat rate health contribution was waived 
in both years in all schemes, which was 1950 HUF a month (about 8 EUR), or around 3% of the minimum 
wage. The subsidy was further extended in 2009 and replaced by a new scheme in 2012. 
 
The scheme (all three variants) has been administered by the tax authority who issue a 
plastic card to eligible persons which indicates the type and eligibility period of the subsidy. 
Cards are issued only if claimed, but the evaluation of claims is automatic, with no discretion or 
further conditions beyond age, education and long term unemployed status. This implies that 
there is no selection in the decision of who may receive the subsidy (prior to the hiring decision 
of the employer) as is often the case with wage subsidy schemes managed by the public 
employment service. Job centres have been actively encouraging job seekers to claim the card.  
The validity of the card and thus the period of eligibility starts on the day of issue. Jobseekers 
are therefore advised to claim the card immediately before starting in their job, so that their 
employer may be eligible for the maximum length of the subsidy. The timing of programme-
participation is thus as follows: the job seeker 1) registers at the job centre, 2) becomes eligible 
for a START card, 3) finds a job 4) applies for a START card, 4) enters the job, 5) ends the 
employment spell within the subsidised period or stays employed. The subsidy lasts for a 
maximum of two years, so that past programme-participation impacts can only be measured 
using data for 2009 or later. 
The START schemes are different from traditional wage subsidies in a number of ways, the 
most important being administration and further obligations. Traditional subsidy schemes 
require the employers to submit an application at a regional PES office and to guarantee that 
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they will employ the beneficiary for at least as long as the benefit was provided. Since the Start 
schemes do not pose such requirements, we expect that their effect will be larger than that of the 
traditional wage subsidy. 
Between July 2007 and December 2008, the START EXTRA card was claimed by 8,859 
persons and issued to 8,392 persons. Less than 2 % of the claims were declined by the tax 
authority, and some 5 % was not issued for other, unknown reasons (e.g. the card holder 
withdrew the claim). During the same period, the number of persons employed with the subsidy 
started to grow steadily, peaking at 19,236in November 2010 (Figure 1). This suggests that most 
cards have been claimed once the job seekers had a job offer, as recommended by job centres. 
Data recorded by jobcentres also appears to confirm this: 82 % of card holders were employed 
within 30 days of requesting a certificate at the job centre and another 7 % were employed within 
90 days.
3
 
Figure 1  
 Number of valid cards and persons employed with a START extra subsidy  
between July 2007 and December 2010  
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Source: Aggregate administrative data by the Tax Authority, prepared on request for the Ministry for 
Labour. The share of refused cards is shown on the right scale (percentages). 
 
                                                 
3 These data come from the digital data archive of the Public Employment Service, who were responsible 
for issuing a certificate to confirm that the jobseeker had the necessary unemployment record to qualify 
for the card. It should be noted however that these archive records cover less than half of all card-
claims, as job centres were not motivated to digitalise this information. 
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In the ensuing analysis we focus on the START EXTRA scheme accessible to long-term 
jobseekers aged over 50 with at least secondary education. This covers half of the recipients 
(Table 2). 
Table 2.  
Persons ever employed with the START extra subsidy until December 2008 
 
aged below 
50 
aged 50 or over of which: men 
primary education 1 298 1 690   754 
secondary or higher 3 127 1 227 
Source: Aggregate administrative data by the Tax Authority,  
prepared on request for the Ministry for Labour. 
 
Between June 2007 and December 2008 there were no other new programmes introduced 
that would target especially the uneducated or older long-term jobseekers. The only other large 
programme intended for these groups was public works schemes, which had already been in 
place since 2001. In 2009, several new programmes were introduced: using EU funding, 
personalised services (e.g. mentoring) were introduced for hard-to-place groups and funding for 
the public works scheme run by municipalities was considerably increased, while active job 
search requirements for jobseekers aged over 55 were considerably relaxed. 
The START EXTRA subsidy appears to be well targeted considering that reemployment 
probabilities are significantly lower for uneducated and older job seekers. Demand for older 
workers declined significantly in the 1990s, partly due to the sharp drop in their relative 
productivity and also due to discrimination (see Lovász 2012 for a review of empirical evidence). 
There is also some evidence that wage subsidies targeted at the long-term unemployed (as in the 
START EXTRA scheme) rather than at low-ability workers are more effective (Brown at al 2011). 
 
4. Data and stylised facts 
We use a dataset drawn from administrative records, constructed for research purposes by the 
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IE-HAS). It contains the matched 
records of 50 % of the adult population including data from (1) health and (2) pension insurance, 
(3) the treasury, and the (4) unemployment register.
4
 The sample was taken from the records of 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description of the data collected by the Pension and the Health Insurance Funds and in the 
Treasury, see Elek et al (2008). 
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January 2002 of the health insurance fund, which include all people residing in Hungary who 
ever had been covered by public health insurance. This practically covers the total population. 
The resulting dataset is a panel of the employment and job search history of the working age 
population covering the period between January 2002 and December 2008. There is 
information on age, sex, dates of entering and exiting employment, earnings (pension insurance 
records), unemployment history and type and period of receiving various transfers (including 
disability benefits) and sick leave. The information on employment and transfers is used to 
reconstruct labour market status in each month during the observed period. The employment-
outcome indicator excludes casual jobs as such jobs are not eligible for the START subsidy. There 
is no data on the actual claiming the START cards (which is recorded by the tax authority), or on 
the employer. 
It must be noted that labour market status in this dataset may not correspond to the actual 
situation in the economic sense. A person receiving unemployment benefit is coded as 
unemployed, even if not actively looking for a job, while a person receiving old-age pension is 
coded as inactive, even if available for work and actively looking for a job.  
In the original administrative data, information on employment, unemployment and transfer 
receipt is in continuous time, recording the type of spell and the dates of starting and ending for 
each spell. This was converted into a monthly structure.  
Although the data are based on administrative records, the nature of the administrative 
sources itself may generate attrition: we lose information on people who leave the 
unemployment register and take up undeclared work, or become inactive without obtaining any 
form of social transfer. However, attrition does not seem particularly large in the age groups we 
examine and it is not very different between the groups eligible and not eligible for START.
5
  
We observe only 18 months following the introduction of the programme, thus we cannot 
look at post-participation outcomes and we have right-censored spells in the dataset. None of the 
spells are left-censored and we have a quite long employment history available. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For jobseekers aged around 50, attrition is 1.04 % for those eligible and 1.28 % for those not eligible for 
START. For the low educated, attrition in the sample is 0.53% and 1.29 % respectively. Deaths are 
recorded in the data and spells ending in death are right censored in our estimates. The lack of 
information on unregistered jobs is not considered a problem as such jobs cannot (by design) benefit 
from the subsidy. 
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5. Objects of interest, identification strategy and raw effects 
A wage subsidy can increase the demand for the beneficiary thus increasing probability of exit 
from registered unemployment or even increase wages when employed. Given that employing a 
programme participant is relatively cheaper, employment spells can last longer, everything being 
equal. As the time-frame of our data does not extend very much into the programme period, we 
shall be focussing on the exit from the registered unemployment spell and wages at entry to the 
subsidised job. 
The thought-experiment we carry out is the following. We observe a group of registered 
unemployed with identical characteristics making them eligible for programme participation at a 
point in time. The programme is introduced. Some of the unemployed are randomly chosen to 
receive the benefits provided by the programme, while the others are left out. Neither of these 
groups takes part in other programmes and nothing happens that would change their chances to 
exit unemployment. As time passes by, we observe all exits from unemployment in both groups. 
To evaluate the programme, we examine the characteristics of the exits to employment: their 
timing, distribution by relevant characteristics. If, for example, exits take a shorter time on 
average in the participant group than in the nonparticipant group, we conclude that the 
programme had an overall beneficial effect.  
We consider two outcomes: 1) employment after 15 months and 2) exit to a job in calendar 
time. In outcome 2) we consider exits during the period starting in July 2007, when the subsidy 
was introduced. This differs from the usual approach of observing exits from the start of the last 
spell of unemployment, which varies in calendar time across individuals. However, given that 
that eligibility depends on the number of months spent in unemployment (accumulated in one 
unbroken spell or several shorter spells), in the usual spell-duration estimates, the treatment 
dummy is negatively correlated with the spell length. To see why, consider the last spell 
including the month when the programme was introduced. Those with an unbroken long spell 
enter into treatment at a later point in their spell, while those who collected the 12 months in 
several shorter spells will enter into treatment sooner. Now assume that spell-duration is 
measured using a single continuous variable. Using standard auxiliary-regression arguments, 
one can show that in the case of a negative correlation between the treatment dummy and the 
variable measuring the spell length and a negative correlation between re-employment and spell 
length (time-decreasing hazard), the estimate of the treatment effect is downward-biased. 
START EXTRA included two sub-programmes P1) for the long-term unemployed aged over 
50 (any education), and P2) for the long-term unemployed with primary education only (any 
age). 
14 
 
The eligibility rules of the sub-programme for older job-seekers (P1) allows us to exploit a 
discontinuity in eligibility to identify the programme effect. In this case, the treatment group is 
formed by those eligible for participation and are slightly above the age 50, while the control 
group is formed by those who are similar to them in all aspects, but stay slightly below age 50 
during the observation period. 
The treatment effect is identified as 
T = E(I|P=1) – E(I|P=0) 
that is as a simple difference between the outcomes of the treatment and the control group, 
where I is the outcome indicator and P is the indicator of programme participation. In order to 
control for the observable differences between the two groups, we can use the conditional 
version of these statistics to obtain 
T' = E(I|P=1,X=x1) – E(I|P=0,X=x0) 
 
Those with at most primary education are excluded, as they are eligible for the same support 
through P2. Our estimates will therefore be local to the age around 50 and also to individuals 
with higher than primary education. 
The discontinuity design strategy assumes that heterogeneity in the variable with the 
discontinuity is irrelevant in determining outcomes. This is not completely so in our case, as age 
tends to reduce the chance of reemployment, but we can account for this in the estimation 
strategy.  
When defining the groups slightly below and slightly above 50, we are facing a trade-off. 
Opening up the age-windows and making the groups larger, we obtain more observations and 
hence more precise estimates. At the same time, groups become more heterogeneous with 
respect to age and the estimates become more prone to age-related effects that might be 
correlated with the outcome – a familiar trade-off between consistency and variance.  
If the differential effect of extraneous factors on outcomes over time (such as seasonality or 
the business cycle) is to be taken into account separately from unemployment duration, it has to 
be controlled for using some statistical method, such as difference in differences strategy, where 
we look at the difference between the control and the treatment outcomes before and after the 
programme.  
15 
 
As already noted, we do not directly observe card claims and define treatment as eligibility 
for the START card. This is not only a pragmatic decision taken for the lack of better data, but 
can also be justified on the basis of the official information on claims, take-up and subsequent 
employment presented in section 3 above. As we have seen, the issuing of vouchers is almost 
automatic and most claims are shortly followed by employment. This suggests that claiming the 
voucher is a formal exercise, which is in reality most likely to happen after the outcome, that is, 
after the employer decided to hire the job seeker. „True‟ take-up is knowledge of the scheme and 
of the age condition by either the employer or the job seeker. As the scheme was actively 
advertised in job centres, it does not seem far-fetched to assume take-up to be close to full and to 
consider all eligible job seekers as treated. The aggregate statistics seem to support this 
assumption as subsidised job entries are rather close to the number of card holders.6 
Based on the above considerations the treatment group is defined as those aged between 50 
and 52.5 and the control group includes those aged between 45.5 and 48.5 in June 2007. The 18-
month gap between them ensures that no member of the control group becomes eligible for 
participation during the observed period. In other respects the two groups both fulfil the 
eligibility criteria at the time the scheme was introduced, i.e. they have accumulated 12 months 
of registered unemployment. As the scheme was not much advertised before its introduction, 
this is likely to eliminate any bias from waiting effects. 
Reemployment effects are estimated in various specifications: probits for the probability of 
being employed 15 or 18 months after the introduction of the scheme and duration models (a 
modified Jenkins type probit) for the probability of exit to a job at any time after the 
introduction of the scheme (Jenkins 1995). 
Raw outcomes for job-seekers aged over 50 are presented in Table 3 and Figures 3-4 below. 
For this sub-programme, the share of those employed in September 2008 is slightly higher in the 
treatment group and the survival function measured in calendar time also suggests some positive 
treatment effect for men. There is no visible positive programme-effect when survival is observed 
during the whole unemployment spell, nor for women. For P2, the share of those employed in 
September 2008 is significantly lower in the treatment group. This is not unexpected however, 
given the higher education level of the control group. 
                                                 
6 If the assumption does not hold, we can identify what is called in the medical literature the intention to 
treat effect (ITT). Although one can regard this as a limitation of the analysis, some would argue that it 
has at least as much policy relevance as the treatment effect itself (Schünemann-Lechner-Wunsch, 
2011). 
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Table 3.  
Raw outcomes for older job-seekers: employed 15 months after 
 (in September 2008) 
 MEN WOMEN 
 Not 
employed 
Employed Ratio Not 
employed 
Employed Ratio 
Control 806 247 23.5% 613 258 29.6% 
Treat 795 264 24.9% 516 238 31.6% 
Difference     1.5%     1.9% 
 
6. Estimation results 
 
Regression results show by and large the same picture as the raw outcomes presented above. 
Marginal effects estimated in various model specifications (see main results below, full 
regression output in the Appendix) tend to be small but positive and significant for men, and 
insignificant for women. Results are robust to the definition of employment and unemployment 
in the data. Control variables take the expected signs. The preferred specification (presented 
below) includes controls for age, education, and past work history. 
For men, the positive effect is driven by job seekers with lower secondary vocational 
education, who constitute 74 % of the sample. For the higher educated, there is no significant 
effect, which may be due to the ceiling on the subsidy (which reduces the value of the subsidy at 
high wages) or possibly to stigma effects, which may be stronger in white collar occupations. 
Table 5.  
Employment effects of older job-seekers 
 15 months 
after 
18 months 
after 
Calendar time 
duration 
CT duration for  
lower sec vocational 
Men 0.1040** 0.0782 0.0144*** 0.0164** 
Women 0.0638 0.1040 0.0016 -0.0034 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   See full regression results in Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix. 
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For women, the subsidy has no significant effect on employment. A possible explanation is 
that older women are less likely to actively look for a job, which lowers the potential impact of 
any wage subsidy that is by design dependant on job search. An earlier result by Micklewright 
and Nagy (2010) points to a similar direction: they found that a mild tightening of job search 
criteria for unemployment benefit recipients had a significant positive effect on the probability of 
reemployment only in the case of women aged over 30. 
7. Substitution effects 
The above results give gross estimates of the programme effect which is valid only if the control 
group was not affected by the program, for example through a replacement of employees by 
long-term unemployed similar to them and eligible to the subsidy. As a crude check for 
displacement effects, we examine the probability of becoming unemployed for the employed 
population in the period between 2005 and 2008, that is, around the time of introducing the 
subsidy. We use the same administrative dataset (which covers 50 % of the employed 
population) and for each educational level estimate a probit regression with dummies for each 
year, for the age group just below 50 and their interactions as well as controls for prior work 
history.  
The results show a U shape evolution of exit probabilities: exits are somewhat less likely 
before and after 2007 but this is only significant for educated workers (see Table 6 below). This 
makes sense in view of general economic growth trends: there was very little growth in Hungary 
in 2007, compared to before 2007 or the first half of 2008. We find no significant trend in the 
job loss probabilities of workers aged below 50 with secondary or higher education. Workers 
with primary education are more likely to exit in 2007 and 2008 compared to 2006. Recalling 
that the positive effect of START EXTRA presented above applied to men with lower secondary 
vocational education, these results suggest that substitution is unlikely to have lessened the 
impact of the programme. 
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Table 6   
Job exit probabilities for men between 2005 and 2008, by level of education 
(probit) 
  Pimary education Lower secondary 
Upper 
secondary or 
higher 
VARIABLES . . . 
        
Year 2005 -0.0282 -0.088 -0.127*** 
 
(0.00560) (0.00543) (0.00975) 
Year 2006 -0.0381 -0.0919 -0.127*** 
 
(0.00515) (0.00571) (0.0108) 
Year 2007 reference 
  
    Year 2008 -0.0428 -0.0779 -0.110*** 
 
(0.00325) (0.00486) (0.00999) 
Year 2005 * age below 50 -0.00733 -0.00152 0.0323 
 
(0.00561) (0.00730) (0.0205) 
Year 2006 * age below 50 -0.0104* -0.000477 0.00836 
 
(0.00561) (0.00739) (0.0202) 
Year 2008 * age below 50 -0.00188 -0.00469 -0.00236 
 
(0.00355) (0.00412) (0.00876) 
Age below 50 0.0143*** 0.0036  -0.0048 
 
(0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0098) 
Age (years) 0.0050*** 0.0015**  -0.0016  
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
Controls for work history 
   Observations 108,347 97,566 23,511 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
8. Cost benefit analysis 
The total cost of the scheme is relatively modest, compared e.g. to re-training or public works 
programmes in Hungary. Between July 2007 and December 2008, the START EXTRA scheme 
cost a total of 1 billion HUF per annum. This amounts to 593 EUR per person (HLM 2011, not 
controlling for right censoring in employment spells). 
Neglecting the costs of administration, which are likely to be very low, we define the cost of 
the programme to equal the additional subsidy (on top of START PLUSZ available to all long 
term unemployed). The short term benefits of the programme include savings on social 
assistance expenditure and employee‟s social security contributions (17 % of the gross wage).7 
                                                 
7 We neglect revenues from the personal income tax as this was practically zero at the relevant wage levels. 
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Long term benefits may include social security contributions after the subsidy expired, longer 
employment spells in the subsequent work history, postponed retirement and savings on health 
care costs. For lack of empirical evidence on the magnitude of these long term effects (in 
Hungary), we concentrate on the short term balance. The average employment spell starting 
after the subsidy was introduced lasts 5 months, so we can safely ignore the fact that the subsidy 
is lower in the second year. 
Assuming that there is no deadweight loss at all, the additional cost of the programme 
amounts to 20 thousand HUF per month for each additional worker entering employment and 
yields 22 thousand HUF of social security contributions and a saving of 26 thousand HUF per 
month, if the worker had been on social assistance. In this case the benefits clearly exceed the 
cost.  This implies that each worker hired as a result of the subsidy generate a fiscal saving of 28 
thousand forints (about 100 EUR) each month as long as they are employed. To estimate 
deadweight loss we compare the number of subsidised job entries as recorded by the Tax 
Authority to the number of additional entries attributable to the programme. The Tax Authority 
recorded that 1227 men and 1895 women were hired with the card during the observed period. 
For women, we assume that all the spending on their subsidy is deadweight as the programme 
had no significant effect on their re-employment. For men, we calculate the number of additional 
workers assuming that the programme effect estimated for men just over 50 (1) applies to all 
older men (2) declines linearly with age, (3) declines exponentially with age.
8
 In the first two 
cases the estimated number of additional workers exceeds the observed official figure by 136% 
and 43% respectively, implying that deadweight loss is zero. In the third case, it is 42% smaller, 
but total monthly savings will still exceed costs if the average employment spell of “true” 
additional workers is at least as long as that of deadweight workers (i.e. those who would have 
been hired without the subsidy). Thus, the programme generates some savings even if it only 
affects men aged between 50-55. The amount of savings depends on how programme effects 
decline with age, which we cannot measure.  If there is no deadweight loss on male jobseekers, 
the savings almost compensate for the loss on women, assuming that their average employment 
spells are the same or shorter. 
 
9. Conclusions 
The paper measures the impact of a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers in 
Hungary, using administrative data. While such subsidies are often promoted as an efficient 
                                                 
8 This implies that programme effects drop significantly over age 52 and are close to zero above age 55. 
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means to speed up recovery or to increase demand for low skilled workers, existing evidence on 
their employment effects is somewhat mixed, especially in the case of transition economies. 
We examine employment and wage outcomes in various model specifications. Results show a 
significant impact on the reemployment rate and wages of men aged over 50. The overall positive 
impact on employment is driven by the largest subgroup of those with lower secondary 
education. The evolution of job loss probabilities around the introduction of the programme 
suggests that the positive employment effect of the programme is not merely caused by 
substitution across various sub-groups of jobseekers.  
For women, the subsidy has no significant effect. A possible explanation is that older women 
are less likely to actively look for a job, which lowers the potential impact of any wage subsidy 
that is by design dependant on job search.  
The subsidy for jobseekers with at least secondary education and aged over 50 is cost 
effective for men, even if the effect exponentially declines with age and considering short term 
benefits only. The overall efficiency of the programme could be improved by narrowing the 
target group to jobseekers with less than upper secondary education and possibly by 
supplementing it with incentives for job search, especially for women. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. 
Summary statistics for the treatment and control group for June 2007 
 Treatment Control 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
       
sex 2043 0.592 0.49 2195 0.559 0.50 
age (years) 2043 50.800 0.77 2195 46.488 0.97 
lower secondary education 2043 0.617 0.49 2195 0.643 0.48 
upper secondary education 2043 0.320 0.47 2195 0.304 0.46 
tertiary education 2043 0.063 0.24 2195 0.052 0.22 
student (months) July06-June07 2043 0.012 0.38 2195 0.005 0.26 
training before July07 (dummy) 2043 0.011 0.11 2195 0.017 0.13 
over 50% disabled (dummy) 2043 0.037 0.79 2195 0.029 0.72 
sick leave (ever b July07) 2043 0.0015 0.04 2195 0.0014 0.04 
labour income and transfers       
reservation wage (HUF/month) 981 71055 22528 1171 71730 23260 
current income (HUF/month) 2043 9960 27631 2195 10349 27605 
smallholder (ever before) 2043 0.020 0.14 2195 0.026 0.16 
disab benefit months July06-June07 2043 0.854 3.00 2195 0.697 2.77 
UB months July06-June07 2043 1.816 3.82 2195 0.918 2.54 
UA months July06-June07 2043 5.718 5.55 2195 6.187 5.46 
disab benefit months b July06 2031 1.485 6.16 2191 1.227 5.57 
UB months b July06 2031 2.554 4.06 2191 2.534 4.02 
UA months b July06 2031 7.160 10.82 2191 7.888 11.13 
Labour market participation        
months worked July06-June07 2043 0.385 0.92 2195 0.434 0.97 
casual work July06-June07 2043 0.164 0.64 2195 0.198 0.70 
months worked b July06 2036 17.724 17.77 2191 15.095 15.87 
casual work b July06 2036 0.159 0.83 2191 0.168 0.80 
student (months) b July 06 2036 0.027 1.20 2191 0.000 0.00 
Notes: Retrospective data cover the period starting in January 2002, except for transfers, where we have 
data from Jan 2004. b=before 
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Table B1.  
Average marginal effects of treatment and age in various model specifications  
of reemployment probabilities (probit) for men and women 
 Specification  1 2  3  4  5  6  
        MEN 
 
            
 
Treat 0.00161 0.0122** 0.0122** 0.0137** 0.0144*** 0.00275 
  
(0.00185) (0.00542) (0.00542) (0.00551) (0.00558) (0.00188) 
 
Age 
 
-
0.00242** 
-
0.00243** 
-
0.00257** 
-
0.00262** 
 
   
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) 
 
        
 
Obs No. 21,202 21,202 21,202 21,182 21,142 21,142 
        WOMEN 
       
 
Treat -0.00156 0.00342 0.00272 0.00124 0.00156 -0.00203 
  
(0.00228) (0.00628) (0.00629) (0.00630) (0.00628) (0.00228) 
 
Age 
 
-0.00115 -0.00110 
-
0.000873 
-
0.000834 
 
   
(0.00132) (0.00133) (0.00132) (0.00132) 
 
        
 
Obs No. 15,889 15,889 15,889 15,887 15,840 15,840 
        Where the explanatory variables of the different specifications are as follows: 
1. Treat 
2. Treat, age 
3. Treat, age, education 
4. Treat, age, education, employment history 
5. Treat, age, education, employment history, regional unemployment 
6. Treat, education, employment history, regional unemployment 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B2. 
 Marginal effects for the reemployment probability (probit) for men 
 VARIABLES 
Men, all levels of education 
 (excluding primary) 
Men with lower secondary 
vocational education 
Treat 0.0144*** 0.0164** 
 
(0.00558) (0.00684) 
Age -0.00262** -0.00308** 
 
(0.00109) (0.00128) 
Lower secondar vocational  -0.00234 
 
 
(0.0107) 
 
A -levels -0.00602 
 
 
(0.0112) 
 
A –levels with vocational -0.000701 
 
 
(0.0110) 
 
Post secondary vocational -0.00393 
 
 
(0.0114) 
 
College -0.0138 
 
 
(0.0111) 
 
University 0.00537 
 
 
(0.0151) 
 
Regional unemployment 0.0395*** 0.0469***  
 
(0.0139) (0.0167) 
training before July07 (dummy) -7.86e-06 -3.15e-05 
 
(0.000355) (0.000416) 
months worked July06-June07 0.00687*** 0.00620*** 
 
(0.00152) (0.00172) 
casual work July06-June07 0.00281* 0.00267 
 
(0.00148) (0.00171) 
months worked (short) July06-June07 0.0172   
 
(0.0258)   
months worked b July06 0.000261*** 0.000337*** 
 
(9.76e-05) (0.000120) 
casual work b July06 -0.000201 -5.54e-05 
 
(0.00125) (0.00142) 
months worked (short) b July06 -0.000281 0.000813 
 
(0.000421) (0.000799) 
disability benefit July06-June07 -0.000147 9.28e-05 
 
(0.000823) (0.00102) 
UB months July06-June07 -0.000577 -0.000919 
 
(0.000508) (0.000614) 
UA months July06-June07 -0.000982*** -0.000753*** 
 
(0.000217) (0.000255) 
disability benefit months July06-June07 -0.000207 -0.000326 
 
(0.000393) (0.000492) 
UB months b July06 -0.000227 -0.000256 
 
(0.000331) (0.000415) 
UA months b July06 -9.48e-05 -0.000136 
 
(0.000112) (0.000126) 
Observations 21,142 15,525 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Table C1   
Job exit probabilities for men between 2005 and 2008, by level of education 
(probit) 
  Primary education Lower secondary 
Upper 
secondary or 
higher 
VARIABLES . . . 
        
Year 2005 -0.0282 -0.088 -0.127*** 
 
(0.00560) (0.00543) (0.00975) 
Year 2006 -0.0381 -0.0919 -0.127*** 
 
(0.00515) (0.00571) (0.0108) 
Year 2007 reference 
  
    Year 2008 -0.0428 -0.0779 -0.110*** 
 
(0.00325) (0.00486) (0.00999) 
Year 2005 * age below 50 -0.00733 -0.00152 0.0323 
 
(0.00561) (0.00730) (0.0205) 
Year 2006 * age below 50 -0.0104* -0.000477 0.00836 
 
(0.00561) (0.00739) (0.0202) 
Year 2008 * age below 50 -0.00188 -0.00469 -0.00236 
 
(0.00355) (0.00412) (0.00876) 
Age below 50 0.0143*** 0.0036  -0.0048 
 
(0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0098) 
Age (years) 0.0050*** 0.0015**  -0.0016  
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
Controls for work history 
   Observations 108,347 97,566 23,511 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
